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Abstract
Do people "vote with their feet" due to a lack of political competition? We formal-
ize the theory of political competition and migration to show that increasing political
competition lowers political rent leading to net in-migration. Our empirical appli-
cation using US data supports this prediction. We nd that an increase in political
competition - in the order of magnitude observed in US Southern states during the
post-war period - leads to an increase in net migration of approximately 36 individuals
per 1000 population. In comparison, birth rates over the last century ranged between
70 and 150 births per 1000 population.
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1 Introduction
Economic orthodoxy suggests that a lack of competition allows rms to restrict output
and raise prices ine¢ ciently. Competition, on the other hand, is welfare enhancing since
it allows consumers to switch producers if their current supplier increases prices. Whether
a lack of competition between political parties has similar welfare destroying e¤ects leading
voters to "vote with their feet" by moving to a more politically competitive domain is far less
discussed. Moreover, the empirical literature on the determinants of migration is virtually
silent on whether political competition matters for migratory choices.
Accordingly, we develop and test a general equilibrium model with endogenous structure
of division of labor to formalize the theory of political competition and migration. The
technical substance of our model is inspired by a model of implicit corruption developed
in Yao (2002a). In an economy, each individual is a consumer-producer who can choose
her number of goods purchased and her number of goods self-provided, which determine her
level of specialization. Each consumer-producer prefers diverse consumption and specialized
production due to economies of specialization in producing each good. We assume that
there is an occupation providing public goods (nanced by tax), such as administration of
infrastructure, judicial services, law enforcement, and transaction services. Individuals must
consume public goods when they trade goods in the market, and these public goods a¤ect
the transaction cost associated with trades. Hence, there is a trade-o¤ between economies
of division of labor and transaction costs. Because of this trade-o¤, as the transaction cost
for a unit of traded good decreases, the equilibrium level of division of labour and extent of
the market increase.
First consider a setting where there is free entry into every occupation including the
public sector (politically competitive). Free entry into each occupation, and exible prices
and tax, generate an equilibrium that not only sorts out the e¢ cient resource allocation, but
also determines an e¢ cient level of division of labor, by trading o¤ economies of division of
labor against transaction costs and trading o¤ resource costs for production of goods against
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that for public goods. The equilibrium level of division of labor and resource allocation
under this setting is Pareto e¢ cient.
We then consider a setting where there is limited competition in the political arena. In
this setting, tax is not determined by free entry into the public sector. Instead, there is a
group of individuals (we call it the elite group) who produce the public goods and manipulate
the tax they charged by blocking entry into the public sector and indirectly manipulate the
output of public goods relative to outputs in other sectors. The ine¢ cient supply of public
goods creates rents that make per capita real income of the elite group much higher than
that of commoners. This distorted terms of trade restricts the extent of the market, and
lowers the equilibrium level of division of labor. Because of economies of division of labor,
the equilibrium level of aggregate productivity in this setting is not Pareto optimal. Within
the state, the degree of rent extraction depends on the commonerslevel of intolerance for
such behaviour by the politically elite - one can think of intolerance being determined by
factors such as education, political ideology, social norms, cultural/moral codes, and religion.
Allowing for multiple states with free migration, we consider the impact of an increase
in one states level of political competitiveness on migration between states. We show that
increasing political competition lowers political rent leading to net in-migration to the state,
which in turn promotes economic development through a higher level of division of labor.
That is, political competition is positively associated with net migration.
The application of our model tests this key prediction. We exploit the signicant cross-
state and within-state variation in political competition to explain internal (state-to-state)
migration in the United States (US) using two sources of migration data: (1) Census data,
1940-2010; and (2) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 1988-2010. A consistent picture
emerges: political competition is positively related to net migration - that is, individuals tend
to migrate to more politically competitive states and away from politically uncompetitive
states. This result is robust to multiple proxies for net migration, model specications and
estimation techniques. First, using decennial Census migration data we include results with
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and with controls for economic and demographic factors. We estimate this model, with
and without lagged net migration terms using System-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991;
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and least squares respectively. Second,
our results are robust when we instrument for political competition to alleviate concerns
about reverse causality - indeed, our general equilibrium model predicts a feedback e¤ect
from migration to political competition. Third, we perform a similar analysis using annual
internal migration data from the IRS and nd similar results.
Our ndings are not only statistically signicant but also economically meaningful. Us-
ing ve-year migration rates from the Census data we nd that an increase in political
competition of 0.3 (common among Southern states of the US for the post war period) leads
to an increase in net migration of approximately 36 individuals per 1000 population. To
put this in context, ve-year birth rates over the last century ranged from a maximum of
150 per 1000 population to 70 per 1000 population.
Our work is related to several streams of literature. First, our model reinforces the ideas
of early scholars on the relation between political competition and development - broadly
dened (see the discussion in Liu and Yang (2007) and the references therein). For example,
Baechler (1976, pg. 80) famously argued:
[f]undamental springs of capitalist expansion are, on the one hand, the coexis-
tence of several political units within the same cultural whole and on the other,
political pluralism which frees the economy.
More recently, Polo (1998) and Svensson (1998) develop models showing that a lack of
political competition can lead to excessive rent-seeking behaviour or the ine¢ cient provision
of public goods. The latest contribution to this area is a paper by Besley et al. (2010),
who develop a model showing that political competition forces politicians to pursue growth
promoting policies which in turn leads to better economic outcomes. They test their model
using US data and nd compelling evidence in favor of their conjecture. Our empirical
strategy and proxy for political competition follows their work closely.
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Second, while our model is closely related to Li and Smyths (2004) model that shows
how competition between the two states generated by free migration results in more e¤ective
third party protection for property rights, which in turn promotes division of labour and
specialization, our model is di¤erent from theirs in two ways. First, our emphasis is
on the migratory response to the level of political competition within the state. Second,
their model considers two consumer goods, which yield limited implications on the e¤ect
of political competition on the extent of the market. Our model considers m goods and
furthermore, it simultaneously endogenizes the level of division of labor, the extent of the
market, the degree of inequality of income distribution and economic performance. Our
paper is also related to Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) theoretical work on explaining why
the west extended the franchise in the nineteenth century. They argue that the decision to
extend voting rights is endogenously determined because of the fear of social upheaval. Our
application uses the 1965 Voting Rights Act to instrument for political competition (more
on this below). Unlike Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) argument, this law change was
exogenous to state-level politics, since it represented a federal intervention into Southern
state politics rather than a decision by Southern states to extend voting rights.
Third, our model reinforces Charles M. Tiebouts (1956) pioneering work on competition
for public goods provision. Under a set of rather strict assumptions, Tiebout establishes a
simple equilibrium model of how consumer-voters voluntary mobility decision determines
the size of local governments (or local communities). Unlike Tiebouts theory, which takes
as given the bundle of taxes and public goods in each location, and then considers competi-
tion between locations, our model studies how political competition within a given location
endogenously determines the level of taxation and publics goods, before considering the mi-
gratory responses of individuals in response to di¤erences in political competition (and hence
bundle of taxes and public goods) across locations.
Finally, our work contributes to empirical literature on the determinants of internal mi-
gration in the US. To be sure, there are many factors that contribute to the decision to
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migrate. This literature is vast so we do not attempt to provide a complete review (see
Greenwood 1975; Greenwood 1985; and Greenwood 1997 for extensive reviews). Research
on the determinants of migration is typically formulated in the context of individual utility
maximization, with early contributions to the literature focusing on economic di¤erences
between origin and destination as key drivers. Later research has emphasized the impor-
tance of non-economic factors such as distance, personal characteristics and life cycle e¤ects,
weather and the environment (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008), the business cycle (Saks and
Wozniak, 2011), and taxes and the availability of public goods (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008).
None however, explicitly look at the impact of di¤erences in political competition between
locations on migratory choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tions 3 provides some historical background and discusses measurement of our key variables,
political competition and internal migration in the US. Section 4 discuss the empirical
methodology and the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a state (k) which has a continuum of consumer-producers of mass Mk, with mk
consumer goods. For reasons of notational convenience, we drop k in this section. The
state subscript will be used later, when we derive the endogenous population size caused by
migration. We assume the absence of a dichotomy between consumers and producers to allow
individuals to choose their levels of self-su¢ ciency, or its reciprocal: levels of specialization.
We can then formalize Allyn Youngs (1928) idea that individual choices of their level of
specialization generates network e¤ects which imply that each persons specialization decision
depends on the number of participants in the network of division of labor (the extent of
the market), while this number is in turn determined by the specialization decisions of all
individuals (the so-called Young theorem: not only does the level of division of labor depend
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on the extent of the market, but the extent of the market is also determined by the level
of division of labor). Each consumer-producer has the following ex ante identical utility
function
(1) u =
mY
i=1
(yi +Kiy
d
i ):
where yi is the amount of good i self-provided, ydi is the amount of good i purchased from
the market. Ki is a fraction of a unit of good i purchased that disappears in transit because
of transaction cost. Hence, K can be interpreted as a trading e¢ ciency coe¢ cient of a unit
of goods purchased.1 We assume that Ki is increasing in the amount of public goods, gi,
provided by the state, and the public good is consumed exclusively within each respective
state. For the sake of simplicity, let
(2) Ki = gi:
We consider the sector providing the public goods as political, administrative, judicial, and
law enforcement services that a¤ect trading e¢ ciency.2 The production of this service in-
volves primarily xed costs but negligible variable costs, which implies signicant increasing
returns. We assume the state is a monopoly supplier of the transaction service and prices
the service indirectly via bundling (implicitly) with other services and taxation.
Suppose, there is free entry into any sector including the public sector. yi+Kiydi is then
the amount of good i that is received for consumption. Each individual has the following
system of production functions for good i and transaction services k:
(3a) yi + ysi = maxf0; li   ag, for a 2 (0; 1);
1The specication of such "iceberg" transaction costs is common practice in equilibrium models with a
trade-o¤ between increasing returns and transaction costs (see Krugman,1995). This specication avoids the
notoriously formidable index sets of destinations/origins of trade ows.
2In this paper, we do not specically model the public good nature of the transaction service. We leave
this for future research.
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(3b) gi = maxf0; lgi   bg, for b 2 (0; 1):
where a and b are the xed learning costs of producing a good and transaction service,
respectively. li and lgi are the amount of labour allocated to the production of good i
and public goods, respectively. ysi is the amount of good i supplied to the market. Each
individual is endowed with one unit of working time, and the endowment constraint is:
(4)
P
i li +
P
i lgi = 1, for li; lgi 2 [0; 1];
The above system of production functions displays economies of specialization; that is,
each persons labor productivity increases as her scope of production activities narrows
down since her total xed learning cost decreases and thereby her production time increases
as she becomes more specialized.3 Here, the endowment of labor is specied for each
person since the learning by doing process, which generates economies of specialization,
is individual specic and cannot be transferred between individuals. This implies that
economies of specialization are localized increasing returns which are compatible with a
competitive market. The budget constraint is given by:
(5)
Pn
i piy
d
i =
Pn
i piy
s
i (1  t),
where pi is the price of good i. The government charges proportional tax on sales income
(sales tax). Let t be the tax rate: t 2 (0; 1). Because the public good is non-rivalrous and
non-excludable, we assume the cost of enforcing the property rights of good g is too high.
Hence, the government cannot charge a tax per usage of the good.
Each consumer-producer maximizes her utility with respect to yi, ydi , y
s
i , yj, gi, li, lj,
lgi  0, subject to the production functions, the endowment constraint, and the budget
constraint. Since all decision variables can take on zero value, each individuals decision
3See Yang and Ng (1993) and Yang and Liu (2009).
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problem is a nonlinear programming problem. There are 4m independent decision variables
yi, ydi , y
s
i , gi (li, lg are not independent of the other decision variables). Each of them can
be either positive or zero. Hence, there are 24m possible interior and corner solutions of the
nonlinear programming problem. Let us assume the public good is homogeneous across good
i. Hence we can use lg instead of lgi. We use the theorem of optimal conguration (Wen,
1998 and Yao, 2002b) to rule out many combinations of the interior and corner solutions.
According to this theorem, an optimal decision does not involve selling and buying the same
goods, does not involve self-providing and buying the same good, and sells at most one good
although many goods can be produced and self-provided. This theorem, together with the
budget constraint and a positive utility requirement, imply that we can divide the population
into many occupations. Each occupation is characterized by the good sold by a specialist
choosing this occupation. It implies that for a person selling good i, her occupation is
characterized by
yi; yj; y
d
r ; y
s
i ; li; lj; gr > 0;
yr; y
d
i ; y
s
r ; lr; lg; y
d
j ; y
s
j = 0 for 8r 2 R and 8j 2 J ,(6a)
whereR is the set of n 1 goods that are purchased from the market and J is the set of non-
traded goods. The individual specialist produces and supplies good i (yi; ysi > 0), demands
good r (ydr ), for r 6= i, and produces non-trade good j (yj). She uses public goods gr for
each purchase of good r. The decision conguration of individuals providing public goods,
who might be government o¢ cials, politicians, public administrators, middlemen, judges,
lawyers, policemen, and infrastructure builders, di¤ers from that of sellers of goods. She
specializes in producing and selling transaction services; she has no demand for transaction
service as she self-provides it. Therefore, the decision conguration of this occupation is
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dened by the following conditions:
yj; y
d
r ; lg; lj > 0;
yr; y
s
r ; lr; y
d
j ; y
s
j = 0 for 8r 2 R0 and 8j 2 J ,(6b)
where R0 is the set of n goods that are purchased from the market by a specialist provider of
public goods. Note that a specialist provider of public goods does not sell any good. Hence,
she buys all n traded goods. Without loss of generality, we assume each person trades goods
1; 2; :::; n and self-provides goods n+ 1; n+ 2; :::;m.
Using the condition (6a) and invoking the symmetry of the model, the decision problem
for commoners (or a consumer-producer selling good i) is:
(7) maxuy = yi(grydr )
n 1ym nj ;
subject to the production function for traded good i and non-traded good j, the endowment
constraint and the budget constraint:
yi + y
s
i = maxf0; li   ag;
yj = maxf0; lj   ag;
li + (m  n)lj = 1;
(n  1)prydr = p1ys1(1  t):
pi and pr are the price of good i and good r, respectively, 8r 2 R. Under this specication,
the consumer-producer self-provides and sells one nal good; buys n 1 nal goods and n 1
transaction services for n  1 goods purchased from the market. t is the proportional tax on
sales income.
Utility maximizing behavior implies that ex ante identical individuals will keep changing
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occupation until utility is equalized across occupation. Let n indirect utility functions,
which involve relative prices of n traded goods to be equalized. We can obtain symmetric
equations. These equations hold simultaneously only if prices of all traded goods are the
same. Hence, we have pi = pr for any i and r. Using this symmetry, we can simplify the
decision problem of a representative consumer-producer selling a good (for instance, good
1). The unconstrained optimization problem for the consumer-producer is:
(8) max
l1;ys1
uy = (l1   a  ys1)gn 1

pr
p1
ys1
(n  1)(1  t)
n 1
1  l1
m  n   a
m n
.
The rst order conditions for the optimization problem yield the demand functions for good
r, ydr , the supply function of good 1, y
s
1, and the optimal amount of labor allocated to produce
good 1, l1. Inserting them back into the utility function, the utility of the consumer-producer
as a function of a, m, n, g and t can be expressed as follow:
(9) uy =

1  a(m  n+ 1)
m
m
gn 1(1  t)n 1:
The above utility function shows that the per capita consumption of each good or service is
[1  a(m n+1)]=m, where 1  a(m n+1) is the time allocated to produce the good sold
and m  n non-traded goods after the total xed learning cost is deducted. As n increases,
the amount of time available for the production increases as the total learning cost incurred
for non-traded goods production, a(m   n) reduces. The denominator shows the persons
total number of types of goods and services, which includes: (i) m   n non-traded goods;
(ii) n  1 traded goods bought in the market; and (iii) one self-provided good, which is sold
as well. Additionally, the person consumes n  1 public goods g. Since the marginal labor
productivity of each good is 1, the per capita consumption can be considered also as the per
capita output of each good or service. Let us now consider the decision problem for a person
selling public goods (the ruling elite). Based on the condition (6b) and the symmetry of
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the model, her constrained optimization problem is:
(10) maxug = (grydr )
nym nj ,
subject to the production functions for public good g and non-traded good j, the endowment
constraint and the budget constraint:
g = maxf0; lg   bg;
yj = maxf0; lj   ag;
lg + (m  n)lj = 1;
npiy
d
i = npiy
s
i t:
The public servant buys n traded goods. Each traded good requires public goods g  gr
to facilitate the transaction. Additionally, she produces m   n non-traded goods. Her
unconstrained optimization problem is:
(11) max
lg
ug = (lg   b)n(ysi t)n

1  lg
m  n   a
m n
:
Due to symmetry, we omit subscript r from g when no confusion is caused. The rst
order conditions for the optimization problem (11) yield the optimum level of specialization
in producing the public goods lg. Cross substituting these solutions we can express the
utility of the public servant as a function of relative prices, a, b, m, and n.
(12) ug =

1  b  a (m  n)
m
m 
[1  a(m  n+ 1)]
m
n
(n  1)n nntn:
Since g = lg   b, substituting g into (9) yields the utility of the consumer-producer as a
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function of a, m, n, and t,
(13) uy =

1  a(m  n+ 1)
m
m 
1  b  a (m  n)
m
n 1
nn 1(1  t)n 1:
Suppose that there is free entry into each occupation including the public sector (politi-
cally competitive). Free entry implies that the utility of a person selling a consumer good
and a person producing the public goods must be equalized. That is:
(14) uy = ug.
Free entry also implies that the price and the tax rate are determined when all consumers-
producers behave competitively. If the public sector yields a higher utility than other sectors
because of a higher tax, competitive entry to public sector will drive up the supply of the
public goods and drive down the tax rate until utility between the public sector and other
sectors are equalized. The utility equalization condition (14) yields the optimal tax rate t,
which is obtained by solving (15).
(15) t
n
n 1 + At   A = 0;
where A  m
1
n 1
n
1
n 1 (n 1) nn 1
[1  a(m  n+ 1)]m nn 1
h
1
1 b a(m n)
im n+1
n 1
. Substituting t into (12)
yields the equilibrium utility which will give utility as a function of n:
(16) u(t(n); n):
The e¢ ciency theorem (see Yang and Liu (2009, pg. 70)) shows that the general equilib-
rium in such a model with an endogenous structure of division of labor is the Pareto corner
equilibrium. In our model here, for a given value of n, utility equalization and market
clearing conditions generate a corner equilibrium. The Pareto optimum corner equilibrium
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is determined by a value of n that maximizes u(t(n); n):
(17) dug(t(n); n)=dn = 0;
and the solution yields the equilibrium number of traded goods n as a function of a, b and
m. Inserting n(a; b;m) into (16) yields equilibrium per capita real income when the state
is competitive. The level of division of labor and the extent of the market are characterized
by n(a; b;m). It represents the number of di¤erent traded goods, which relates to diversity
of occupations. It positively relates to each persons level of specialization.4
A general equilibrium is dened by relative prices and numbers of individuals choosing
various occupations and associated quantities of goods produced, traded, and consumed, that
satisfy the following conditions: (i) Each individual chooses her labour allocation among all
production activities of goods and services and her trade plan, which generate her consump-
tion bundle, to maximize her utility for given prices of traded goods and given numbers of
individuals choosing various occupation congurations. (ii) The prices of traded goods and
numbers of individuals choosing various occupations clear all markets.
Let Mk;i be the number (measure) of individuals selling good i in state k. Recall that gi
is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and thus there is no market for it. The market clearing
conditions for good i is given by:
(18) Mk;iysi =
P
r2RMk;ry
d
i (r) +Mk;gy
d
i (g), 8i = 1; 2; :::; n;
where i is an element of the index set of n traded goods, ydi (r) and y
d
i (g) are the demand
4As shown in Yang (1996, 2001, ch. 11), each individuals level of specialization, the extent of the market
(aggregate market demand for all traded goods by all individuals), and the degrees of commercialization (the
ratio of commercialized income to total income which includes self-su¢ cient income), of trade dependence,
of market integration (the reciprocal of the number of separate local business communities), of production
concentration (the reciprocal of the number of producers of each trade good), the extent of endogenous
comparative advantage (di¤erence in productivity of a traded good between its seller and buyer), and of
diversity of occupations and economic structure, all increase with the level of division of labor, while the
degree of self-su¢ ciency (ratio of self-provided income to total income) decreases with the level of division
of labor.
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function for good i by a person selling good r, and public goods g, respectively. Due
to symmetry,
P
r2RMk;ry
d
i (r) = (n   1)Mk;rydi (r). One of n + 1 equations in (18) is
not independent of other equations due to Walras law. The n independent equations,
together with the population size identity
P
sMk;s =Mk, where s = 1; 2; :::; n; g, yield the n
equilibrium numbers of specialists selling n traded goods and the number of public servants
providing public goods. Let Mk;y be the number of specialists selling a traded good. The
symmetry of the market clearing conditions across goods generates the number of public
servant relative to the number of specialists selling a traded good (or the relative size of the
government):
(19)
Mk;g
Mk;y
= 1;
as ydi (g) = y
s
i t and y
d
i (r) = y
s
i (1  t)=(n  1).
2.1 Equilibrium when the state is not politically competitive
Suppose the ruling elites of the state have the ability to team up and e¤ectively block
the entry into the public sector. They do so by manipulating the number of ruling elite
members relative to specialists in other occupations (commoners). A historical example,
which we discuss in more detail below, is how the Democratic party in the US Southern
states e¤ectively eliminated political competition between 1890 and 1960 by introducing
various voting restrictions that impacted on the poor and black population who made up
the support base for the Republican party.
To maximize utility of each member of the elite group, to the extent that commoners
do not choose to migrate to another location, the ruling elites extract political rent from
commoners by charging a high tax (or providing a low quality public goods).
Since there is no free entry into the elite group, the state is, by denition, not politically
competitive as utilities between elites and commoners are not equalized. Since the indirect
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utility function of the ruling elites is an increasing function of tax relative to the price of
goods bought, their utility increases and the commoners utility decreases as the relative size
of elite group to commoners decreases. Dene  as the intolerance level of commoners. If
commonersutility falls below , they will migrate away. Hence, the non-migration constraint
is:
(20) uy  .
Exogenous factors such as education, political ideology/freedom, social norms, cultural/moral
codes, and religion of individuals in the society determine intolerance levels (). Since max-
imization of the ruling elites utility is equivalent to the minimization of a commoners, the
ruling elite group will manipulate relative size of public sector to other sectors until:
(21) uy = .
If  is low, the level of political competitiveness within the state tends to be low because the
ruling elites can extract more rent from commoners, where the rent equals to the di¤erence
between ug and  as:
(22) ug > uy = :
uy and ug are derived in the same way as outlined in previous section. The intolerance
constraint (21), together with utility equalization conditions across all occupations of com-
moners, yields the optimal tax rate, t, which is a function of :
(23) t = 1   1n 1(n):
where (n)  m
m+n 1
n 1
n
[1  a(m  n+ 1)]  mn 1 [1  b  a (m  n)] 1. Given this optimal tax
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rate, the utility of the public servant is:
ug(t(; n); n; ) =

1  b  a (m  n)
m
m 
[1  a(m  n+ 1)]
m
n
(n  1)n nn

h
1   1n 1(n)
in
:(24)
The equilibrium level of division of labor n is a function of , given by the rst order condition:
(25) dug(n(); )=dn = 0:
If education, political ideology/freedom, social norms, cultural moral codes, and religion
cause individuals to have a low level of intolerance, the level of political competitiveness
within the state is low and the ruling elites will use their monopoly power for rent seeking.
This rent seeking behavior by the elite group is called state opportunism, which is considered
by North and Weingast (1989) and Sachs, Woo, and Yang (2000) as a major obstacle of
economic development. Further, political competition promotes a higher level of division
of labor in the economy through a lower political rent. A higher level of division of labor,
represented by a larger number of traded goods, means higher aggregate productivity in our
model of endogenous structure of division of labor. We now establish the rst proposition.
Proposition 1. Lower political competitiveness is associated with a higher tax rate, inferior
economic performance and a higher degree of inequality of income distribution (between the
ruling elite and commoners).
Proof See Appendix A.
This result reinforces earlier work by Polo (1998), Svensson (1998) and Besley et al.
(2011) who develop models showing that a lack of political competition can lead to exces-
sive rent-seeking behaviour, the ine¢ cient provision of public goods and inferior economic
outcomes. Moreover, Besley et al. (2011) show empirically that political competition forces
politicians to pursue growth promoting policies that lead to higher income growth.
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We now extend the model to consider a two-states case (k = 1; 2). Let M be the mass
of a continuum of consumer-producers, forM =M1+M2. There is no goods trade between
the states (and public goods produced within the state can only be consumed locally) but
individuals are free to migrate between states. The opportunity cost of immigration depends
on . The non-migration constraint (20) is rewritten as follows:
(26a) uy;1  maxf1; uy;2g;
(26b) uy;2  maxf2; uy;1g:
Consider an increase in the degree of political competitiveness of one state relative to
the other, holding all else constant. We model this through an increase in the level of
intolerance, k, in one state relative to the other. This exogenous increase in k is empirically
akin to the introduction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which, for the rst time, allowed full
political participation for the poor and black population in Southern US states (more on
this below). In contrast to Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) argument that the decision to
extend voting rights could be endogenous because of the fear of social unrest and revolution,
the introduction of 1965 Voting Rights Act is an exogenous event since it is a nationwide
prohibition of the denial or abridgment of the right to vote. It gave the Attorney General
the right to challenge any discriminatory voting practices in state or local election in the
court of law. From the non-migration constraints above, this raises uy;k since the political
elite must allow entry into the public sector which leads to less rent extraction. We now
establish our second proposition.
Proposition 2 (Voting with your feet). Ceteris paribus, an increase a states level of political
competitiveness, increases inward migration relative to the other state.
Proof See Appendix A.
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This proposition is the key prediction we focus on in our empirical testing: that political
competition is positively related to net migration.
In our general equilibrium model, an increasing population, in turn, promotes economic
development through a higher level of division of labor. Such an increase will foster market
integration, enhance production concentration, utilize endogenous comparative advantage
and increase occupation diversity in the economy.
Finally, we show that in equilibrium, an increase in the level of political competitiveness
in one state will increase the level of political competitiveness in competing state because of
the threat of out-migration.
Proposition 3. An increase in the level of political competitiveness in one state will increase
the level of political competitiveness in competing state because of the threat of outward mi-
gration. The ruling elites will lower the political rent extraction through a lower tax rate.
Consequently, income inequality will be lowered and economic performance will be improved.
Proof See Appendix A.
This result naturally follows due to our general equilibrium framework. Empirically,
testing this proposition is outside the scope of this paper, however, it does suggest an avenue
for future empirical work studying the consequences of migration. This literature is in
itself large and diverse, however, there is no systematic study on the impact of migration on
political outcomes.
3 Internal Migration & Political Competition
Internal migration has a long history of being a dening characteristic of the US economy.
Enhanced mobility of the US labour force allows for better allocation of resources and faster
adjustment to change (due to, say, technological advances) relative to other countries. A
recent paper by Molly et al. (2011) documents a decline in internal migration rates in the
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US over the last two decades, this decline marks a noticeable departure from the long term
trend reported in studies by Ferrie (2003) and Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (2004) who show
a rise in internal migration from 1900 to 1990. Despite this decline, internal migration
in the US remains high. Molly et al. (2011) estimate that, annually, 1.5 percent of the
population moves between the four Census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West)
and approximately 1.3 percent of individuals moves to a di¤erent state within Census regions
(see Figure 2 of their paper).
Because we are interested in migratory responses to political competition at the state
level, our study investigates state-to-state migration. We measure migration over two dif-
ferent periods, annually and over a ve year period using two di¤erent data sources. There
are trade-o¤s with each approach. Over a longer time period, migration is more likely to be
observed since the costs of migration - particularly long distance migration to another state -
can be high. However, the potential for measurement error is higher. Specically, a person
who lived in the same state ve years ago and at the time of the survey would be classied as
a nonmigrant even if that person lived in a di¤erent state for the period in between surveys.
Similarly, individuals who move multiple times will be classied as having only moved once.
To calculate annual migration, we use IRS data over the period 1988 to 2010. The IRS
denes tax ling units as the ler, plus all exemptions represented on the forms. From this
they compute the number of returns (which approximates households) and the number of
exemptions claimed (which approximates people) that ow between pairs of states. The
IRS reports ows in both directions between each pair, so both gross ows and net ows can
be calculated.
Our other source of migration data come from the decennial Census. For samples since
1940, researchers are able to observe whether an individual is living in the same or a di¤erent
state than they were ve years ago. Using these data, we are able to compute ve year
migration for the period 1940 to 2010.
Our focus will be on the relation between political competition and net migration rather
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than gross migration. There are several reasons for this. First, our theoretical model
predicts that higher political competition, all else equal, will attract inward migration that
leads to an increase in the size of the overall population in the more competitive state.
Accordingly, we need to measure in-migration relative to out-migration at the state level to
be able make inferences about the impact of political competitiveness on the population -
positive net migration leads to population growth other things equal. This point is even
more important in light of the observation that areas with high in-migration also tend to
have high rates of out-migration (Greenwood, 1975). Second, by focusing on net migration,
we do not need to control for variables that are the same across any pairing of states, such as
distance, or the monetary cost of moving (Greenwood, 1975). In the analysis that follows,
we use three alternative measures of migration: (1) net migration - the number of individuals
that migrate in less those who migrate out of a particular state; (2) net migration rate - net
migration as a proportion of the state population; and (3) net migration share - net migration
as a fraction of all migrating individuals in a given time period. Panel (b), (c) and (d) in
Figure 1 graphs these net migration measures over time using the Census data. We plot net
migration for Southern states and non-Southern states separately and show that post-1960
there was a substantial shift in internal migration patterns in the US: away from other states
and into the South. We can also see this in Panel C of Table 1, where net migration in the
Southern states went from being negative in decades pre-1960 to positive post-1960. This
pattern reverses the trend observed in the earlier part of the century reported in Wright
(1987 (Table 2); and 1999 (Table 1)) where there was mass exodus from the Southern states.
We argue and go on to show that one key reason for these shifts in migration patterns was
due to changes in political competition in the US South relative to the non-South throughout
the century.
Our measure of political competition follows Besley et al. (2010) and uses data originating
from the work of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), who collected election results for a broad
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set of directly elected state executive o¢ ces.5 A competitive election is one where the
result is close, accordingly, Besley et al. (2010) dene a party neutral measure of political
competition to be the following:
(27) PCst =  jdst   0:5j
Where PCst is political competition in state s at time t and dst is the vote share of the
Democrats in all state-wide races in state s at time t. Panel (a) of Figure 1 extends
the work of Besley et al. (2010) and plots 10-year averages of political competition over
time separately for Southern and non-Southern states. As can be seen, there is signicant
variation in political competition across states and over time. There are some noteworthy
trends to point out. First, there is a signicant di¤erence in the level of political competition
between Southern and non-Southern states. Second, this di¤erence increases between 1890
and 1940 due to a reduction in political competition in Southern states. Third, beginning in
1940s, there is an increase in political competition in the US South relative to the US non-
South to such a degree that, today, the US Southern states are more politically competitive
than non-Southern states. Panel C in Table 1 also shows the changing disparity in political
competition between Southern states and the rest of the US pre- and post-1960. Over
this period political competition in Southern states increased from an average of -0.197 (a
winning margin of about 70% to 30%) to -0.073 (a winning margin of about 51% to 49%).
As pointed out by Besley et al. (2010), amongst others, the rst half of the 20th century
was characterized by the virtual monopoly of the Democratic Party in many of the Southern
states. By 1880s, the Democrats were rmly in power in the Southern states. However,
because the US South had a large black (and low income) majority, white Democrats still
feared a possible resurgence of minorities and the poor at the polls. Accordingly, several
5These elections range from US representatives, over the governorship, to down-ballot o¢ cers, such as
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and so on. We thank James Snyder for gener-
ously providing us with an updated version of the data.
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voting restrictions including the white primary, multiple ballot boxes (e.g. South Carolinas
"Eight Box Law" which was an indirect literacy test), poll taxes, literacy tests, and ultimately
violence were employed over the years to restrict minorities and the poor from voting. This
e¤ectively eliminated opposition to the Democrats during this period, and the fall in political
competition is clearly visible in Figure 1.
Over time, a number of these practices were eliminated, and by the late 1950s, the remain-
ing two major obstacles to full political participation were the poll tax and the literacy test.
It was not until the 1960s that the dominance of the Democrats in US South was challenged
with the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratied in 1964, prohibiting
poll taxes in federal elections, and the introduction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which did
two things: (1) it authorized the US attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of
the use of poll taxes in state and local actions; and (2) it provided for direct federal action in
"covered jurisdictions" to prohibit the use of the literacy test.6 Consequently, federal courts
quickly struck down the remaining poll taxes in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.7
The 1965 Voting Rights Act also targeted the states of Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, 40 counties in North Carolina, Apache County in Arizona, and Honolulu
County in Hawaii because of their literacy tests and low turnout. The resultant impact on
political competition in the US South was a reversal of the pre-war decline. Wright (1987
pg. 173) sums up the transformation of Southern politics during this period nicely:
"To the economic historian taking a view of the South and its political econ-
omy in the broadest sense, it appears that a more fundamental transformation
was underway, a basic change in the priorities of the regions economic interest
groups"
Before moving onto to our main analysis, we rst perform a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erence
6A covered jurisdiction was dened to be a state, county, parish, or town that used a test or device (e.g.,
a literacy test) and had less than a 50 percent turnout in the 1964 presidential election.
7Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina repealed theirs by 1945, followed by South Carolina
and Tennessee in 1951 and Arkansas in 1964.
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analysis of our key variable of interest PCst as well as our measures of net migration. Our
treatment group is all States for which the 1965 Voting Rights Act targeted (i.e. Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Arizona, and
Texas). The baseline period is dates prior to 1965 and the follow up period is dates after
1965.8 The results for the univariate analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 2 and the
multivariate version where we control for time and state xed e¤ects are reported in Panel B.
For all four variables, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence statistic is positive and signicant which
suggests that political competition in the Southern states increased signicantly relative to
all other states after the introduction of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. This same result
was also found for our measures of net migration.
4 Empirical Approach & Results
Wewill discuss our empirical strategy in two steps, our approach di¤ers slightly depending
on the migration data that we employ. First, we discuss our approach using Census data
covering the period 1940-2010. Second, we discuss our empirical approach using the more
recent IRS annual migration data.
The spirit of our model is to capture long term shifts in political competition and the
resultant impact on migratory choices. Using the Census data, we are considering migratory
choices over a longer time period (data are decennial) in response to longer-term changes in
political competition and other economic variables. Accordingly, the analysis here can be
considered as our main results. Proposition 2 states that higher political competition leads
to higher inward migration (positive net migration). To test this empirically, we estimate
regressions of the form:
(28) NMst = s + t + PCst + 
0
X+ "st,
8Note that we are using 10 year averages for PCst - see discussion below.
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where NMst is the net migration in state s at time t. PCst is political competition in state
s at time t, s and t are state and time xed-e¤ects. X is a vector of state-specic,
time-varying economic and socio-demographic characteristics including: personal income
growth (Growth), taxation as a fraction of personal income (Tax), capital expenditure as a
fraction of taxes (Capital), the proportion of the population that is non-white (Non-white),
the proportion of the population over 25 with high school education (High School), and the
proportion of the population who are female (Female). Unconditional sample means for
these variables are contained in Table 1.9 We estimate robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the state level. We emphasize the long-term shifts in two ways: we instrument
for political competition (see below), and average the data over longer periods. Since net
migration gures are obtained from the Decennial Census, we only have an observation every
decade. Accordingly, PCst and all controls are averaged over the 10 year period leading up
to the decade in question. For example, the gure for PCst in, say, 1960 is the average of
the variable from 1951 to 1960. The results are robust to the period chosen to average over
as well as using end of decade gures rather than averaging.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the results for our di¤erent measures of net migration: net
migration, net migration rate, and net migration share respectively. In each table, column
(1) is an estimation of (28) without control variables contained in X. The second column
of results addresses the possibility of reverse causation from net migration to the degree of
political competition (indeed, we argue there is reverse causation in Proposition 3). To min-
imize such endogeneity, which would likely bias our estimates downwards (since Proposition
3 argues that negative net migration leads to an increase in political competition), we use the
exogenous intervention of the federal government in the Southern states via the 1965 Voting
Rights Act to instrument for political competition.10 Specically, we instrument political
competition with a variable which is equal one after 1965 if a state was the target of federal
9State personal income is available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the period after 1929. Tax
and Capital are published in the annual census publication State Government Finances. Non-white, High
School and Female are collected from the decennial Census.
10Similar approaches have been used by Besley et al. (2010) and Husted and Kenny (1997).
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intervention due to having either a literacy test or a poll tax (or both) and zero before 1965.
In column (3) we follow Besley et al. (2010) and create binary indicators for high,
medium and low competition and include these, rather than the continuous measure of
political competition. These indicators correspond to values of political competition larger
than -0.10 (PC1 ), -0.25 (PC2 ), and -0.4 (PC3 ) respectively.11 Finally, columns (4) and (5)
repeat the analysis in columns (2) and (3) respectively with our additional control variables
as well as lagged net migration (LNM ). Since we include xed-e¤ects as well as a lagged
dependent variable, we report results from System-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimation (rather than IV or least squares).
A consistent picture emerges across all three tables. Political competition is positively
related to net migration. That is, we nd strong support for Proposition 2 which states that
an increase in political competition will lead to positive net migration, even after controlling
for other factors.
To be consistent with existing studies of net migration, we focus the rest of our discussion
on Table 4 where our dependent variable is the state net migration rate (net migration
as a proportion of state population). Comparing column (1) with (2) we see that OLS
estimates do in fact underestimate the impact of competition on net migration. When we
include additional control variables in column (4), the coe¢ cient on political competition
increases. Columns (3) and (5) show that the e¤ect of political competition indeed appears
to be nonlinear - it seems that net migration only responds to greater competition when
competition exceeds -0.10.
Our results are not only statistically signicant but also economically signicant. Our
coe¢ cient estimates range from a conservative 0.07 in column (1) to 0.12 in column (4). This
suggests that an increase in political competition by about 0.3 - typical for many Southern
states over the last century - will lead to an increase in the net migration rate of between 0.021
(or 21 individuals per 1000 population) and 0.036 (or 36 individuals per 1000 population).
11Note the interpretation, for example, the estimated e¤ect of a change in political competition from below
-0.4 into the range [-0.10, -0.25], is the sum of the coe¢ cients on the variables PC3 and PC2.
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To help put this in context, annual birth rates in the US over a similar period have declined
from just over 30 births per 1000 population in 1910 to less than 14 per 1000 population
by 2010.12 These gures are not directly comparable since birth rates are annual and the
migration numbers are ve-year migration rates, so to help with comparison, if we take the
1910 and 2010 birth rates as upper and lower bounds respectively, then 5-year birth rates are
somewhere between 150 per 1000 population and 70 per 1000 population. Our estimation
suggests that the impact of increasing political competition on net migration go quite some
way to arresting the impact of declining birth rates on (Southern) state economies.
Looking at the other results from our main regression with controls (column 4) there
does not seem to be much controversy. As expected, higher income growth and a larger
proportion of the state that has high school education is positively related to net migration,
while higher taxes as a proportion of income is negatively related to net migration. There is
evidence to suggest that higher capital expenditure relative to taxes is negatively related net
migration, while at rst this seems counterintuitive, this may simply reect that high capital
expenditure is correlated with larger governments, which impose higher taxes. There is no
relation between the proportion of non-whites in the population and net migration while
the proportion of females is negatively related (we do not have an a priori expectation as to
why this may be). Finally, surprisingly, past net migration does not seem to be related to
current migration.
We reestimate (28) using annual migration data from the IRS. During the IRS sample
period of 1988-2010, there is signicantly less variation (both across states and overtime) in
political competition, the analysis here explains current state level variation in short-term
migratory decisions in response to short-term changes in political competition. Since our
model emphasizes longer term shifts, we consider this analysis to be a robustness test to the
preceding results.
State elections are on a two year cycle, and we have annual migration data, accordingly,
12Sources: Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, web:
www.dhhs.gov
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we need to either (1) aggregate net migration over a two year window; or (2) follow Besley
et al. (2010) and interpolate our political competition variable in between elections. We do
both and the results are the same. We report results using migration aggregated over two
years as these are our conservative estimates. The nal decision we need to make is whether
we calculate net migration based on the number of lers (which approximates households)
or exempt individuals (which approximates people). We choose the former to provide the
most conservative estimate of net migration.
The drawback using this second data set is that we cannot look at longer term trends
and we cannot adequately control for the potential of endogeneity using the introduction of
the Voting Rights Act to instrument for political competition (we do however treat political
competition as an endogenous variable in the System-GMM estimation). A benet, however,
is we are able to control for additional political variables of interest that may also explain
migration patterns.
In this analysis our vectorX of state-specic, time-varying economic and socio-demographic
characteristics include: Growth, Capital and Tax, which are dened in the same way as be-
fore, the percentage of high school dropouts (Dropout), the proportion of blacks (Black),
and the proportion of female-headed households (Female), and the proportion of employed
individuals (Employed).13 In addition, to investigate whether our results are indeed due to
changes in political competition rather than di¤erences between the Democratic and Repub-
lican Party, we follow Besley et al. (2010) and use an indicator variable of the governors
party a¢ liation (Democrat) equal to one if the governor is a Democrat, equal to zero if he
is a Republican, and missing in the case of Independents.14 To measure state-level party
composition or control (Control), we use the fraction of Democrat incumbents: D= (D +R)
less the fraction of Republican incumbents R= (D +R) in all statewide races (excluding the
president).15
13Employment is from Bureau of Economic Analysis. Demographic variables are taken from Beck, Levine
and Levkov (2012) and originally sourced from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
14This information was obtained from the National Governors Association at www.nga.org.
15These data come from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), and a recent update of this data was kindly
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Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the results for our di¤erent measures of net migration: net
migration, net migration rate, and net migration share respectively. In each table there are
six columns: without controls or lagged net migration (column 1), with controls but without
lagged migration (column 3), with controls and lagged migration (column 5), and columns
(2), (4) and (6) repeat the analysis in columns (1), (3) and (5) respectively replacing the
continuous measure of political competition with binary indicators for competition dened
previously.16
With few exceptions, our results are consistent with those using the Census migration
data. Again, focusing on the results for net migration rate (Table 7), our main regression
in column (5) reports an estimated coe¢ cient of 0.01 or 1 household per 1000 population
(for a 0.1 increase in political competition - one third of the approximate 0.3 increase in
political competition in Southern states during the post-war period). Again, comparing
this to current approximate two-year birth rates of 28 per 1000 population the resultant
impact of political competition on net migration is not only statistically signicant but also
economically signicant - even in this later period when political competition across states is
much more homogeneous.17 Growth and lagged net migration are positively related to net
migration as is the proportion of high school dropouts. The rst two results just mentioned
are to be expected however the result suggesting that states with a higher dropout rate tends
to have positive net migration is puzzling, it may be the case that this result reects the fact
that high dropout rates tend to be correlated with a less skilled labour force, implying that
there is a relatively higher demand for skilled labour in these states. Looking across the
tables, the only other consistent evidence we nd is that higher taxes tend to be negatively
related to net migration.
supplied by James Snyder in electronic form.
16Note that due to the reduced variability in political competition in this sample period, we only use the
rst two indicators variables instead of all three.
17It is worth noting that the coe¤cient on political competition is positive but insignicant in colummn
(1) of Table 7. This is to be expected since there are no additional controls and we use OLS to estimate
the relation. We argued earlier that endogeneity will likely bias our least squares estimates downward and
against nding a result. We see that using System-GMM and instrumenting for political competition the
coe¤cient increases and is signicnat.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We develop and test a model of political competition and migration. Our model predicts
that an increase in political competition (in one state relative to the other) leads to an
increase in net migration.
Our application uses the substantial variation in political competition across US states to
study its impact on net migration ows. Using migration data from the Decennial Census
for the entire post-war period we show that political competition is positively related to net
migration. That is, people tend to migrate towards more politically competitive states. This
result is robust to specication and estimation technique. Further, to alleviate endogeneity
concerns, we use the introduction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act to instrument for political
competition. Results remain unchanged.
In further tests, we use annual migration data from the IRS covering the last two decades
to investigate if the longer term relationship between political competition and migration is
still observed for a more recent period where there is signicantly less variation in political
competition across the states. We again nd consistent evidence that political competition
is important for migratory choices. So to answer our original question: do individuals "vote
with their feet" in response to a lack of political competition? Yes.
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A Appendix (Proofs of Propositions)
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the inverse relation between political competitiveness and
tax, we di¤erentiate t with respect to :
(29)
dt
d
=   1
n  1
n
n 1(n) < 0:
Since  is positively related to the states political competitiveness, states with a lower level
of political competitiveness will have a higher equilibrium tax rate.
Next we prove that states with a lower level of political competitiveness will have in-
ferior economic performance. To prove this statement, it is su¢ cient to show that the
equilibrium level of division of labor n increases with , as n is positively related to the
degree of commercialization, market integration, trade dependence, production concentra-
tion, occupation diversity, and the extent to which the endogenous comparative advan-
tage is utilized. Dene G  lnug(n(); ) = h(n) + n ln[1    1n 1(n)], where h(n) =
m ln[1  b  a (m  n)] + n ln [1  a(m  n+ 1)]  (m + n) lnm + n ln(n  1) + n lnn. The
rst order condition in (25) is equivalent to:
(30)
@G
@n
= h0(n) +
n
1
n 1
1   1n 1(n)

ln 
(n  1)2(n)  
0(n)

+ ln[1   1n 1(n)] = 0:
Di¤erentiating (30) again (with respect to n and ) and using the implicit function theorem,
it can be shown that:
(31)
dn
d
=  
>0z }| {
@2G=@@n
@2G=@n2| {z }
<0
> 0:
@2G=@2n < 0 because of the second order condition for utility maximization. Expanding
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@2G=@@n:
(32)
@2G
@@n
=

 n+2
n 1
(n  1)(1   1n 1(n))
"
n
1   1n 1(n)

ln 
(n  1)2(n)  
0(n)

+
(n)
n  1
#
.
It can be easily seen that @2G=@@n > 0 because for the rst order condition (30) to hold,
ln 
(n 1)2(n) 0(n) must be positive since ln[1 
1
n 1(n)] = ln t < 0. Expression (31) implies
that as the degree of intolerance  decreases, the state becomes less politically competitive
(more rent extraction), the equilibrium level of division of labor, n, decreases, and thus
lowers economic performance. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose there is a positive exogenous shock to the level of political
competitiveness in state 1. For example, an extension of voting rights in state 1 raises 1
to 01. If the revised constraint is binding, uy;1 will increase to u
0
y;1 due to the result of
proposition 1; when  rises, the tax rate falls and the level of division of labor increases. The
real per capita income of commoners in state 1, uy;1, increases. Meanwhile, if the impact of
the shock is su¢ ciently high, the non-migration constraint for commoners in state 2 may be
violated:
(33) uy;2 < maxf2; u0y;1g.
State 2s commoners will move from state 2 to state 1. As the population in state 1, M1,
increases, the scope for further specialization and division of labor increases, which implies
that the total number of consumer goods will increase. For example, if the state consists
of two individuals, the maximum number of consumer goods is two when both are fully
specialized. When the population increases to three, the maximum number of consumer
goods increases to three. Because of the preference for diverse consumption (see (1)), the
real per capita income of commoners in state 1 must increase. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3. If the impact of the positive shock to 1 is su¢ ciently high, state 2s
commoners will move from state 2 to state 1. The population in state 2, M2, tends to zero
and the population in state 1 tends to M . Since the utility of the ruling elite increases as
the population size increases (more tax revenue), and as M2 tends to 0, their utility goes to
zero. As both states compete and undercut (through lowering the tax rate), in equilibrium,
(34a) u0y;1 = maxf01; u0y;2g;
(34b) u0y;2 = maxf2; u0y;1g;
for u0y;2 > uy;2 due to lower tax rate. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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B Appendix (Tables and Figures)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the mean of variables that are used in the empirical analysis. Political
competition (PC ) data come from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) and the data covers the
period from 1890 to 2010. Migration data come from two sources: (1) individial income tax
returns led with the IRS from 1988 through 2010, and (2) the US Census from 1940 through
2010. Net Migration is the net interstate migration - the number of individuals that migrate
in less those who migrate out of a particular state. Net Migration Rate is the net migration as
a proportion of the state population. Net Migration Share is the net migration as a fraction of
all migrating individuals in a given time period. Growth is the income growth. Employment is
total employed persons as a percentage of population. Tax is total tax collected as a percentage
of total income. Capital is total capital expenditure as a percentage of taxes. Black is the
percentage of black population. Dropout is total high school dropouts as a percentage of
population. Democrat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Governor is a Democrat.
Control the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican incumbents in
all statewide races (excluding the president). Female is the percentage of female population.
Non-white is the percentage of non-white population. High School is the percentage of adults
(>25 years old) with high school diploma.
PANEL A: Political Competition and Migration
1988-2010 1940-2010
Mid
West
North
East
South West
Mid
West
North
East
South West
PC -0.056 -0.080 -0.065 -0.077 -0.068 -0.071 -0.149 -0.069
Net migration 4161 11959 -9724 -2855 -0.521 -0.865 0.485 0.486
Net migration rate 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 -0.005 0.001 0.018
Net migration share 0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.003
PANEL B: Demographic and Economic Variables
1988-2010 1940-2010
Mid
West
North
East
South West
Mid
West
North
East
South West
Growth 0.061 0.052 0.061 0.069 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.063
Tax 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.071 0.052 0.051 0.059 0.061
Capital 0.169 0.158 0.178 0.196 0.260 0.268 0.270 0.312
Employment 0.609 0.582 0.553 0.590 - - - -
Black 0.067 0.063 0.188 0.026 - - - -
Dropout 0.072 0.085 0.126 0.086 - - - -
Democrat 0.359 0.448 0.552 0.488 - - - -
Control -0.017 0.168 0.046 -0.110 - - - -
Female Head 0.338 0.392 0.369 0.343 - - - -
Female - - - - 0.520 0.522 0.562 0.510
Non-white - - - - 0.071 0.069 0.269 0.131
High School - - - - 0.551 0.553 0.488 0.616
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PANEL C: Variables Separated Out by Pre-1960 Period and Post-1960 Period
Mid West North East South West
Pre-
1960
Post-
1960
Pre-
1960
Post-
1960
Pre-
1960
Post-
1960
Pre-
1960
Post-
1960
PC -0.079 -0.050 -0.073 -0.068 -0.197 -0.073 -0.071 -0.067
Net Migration -0.079 -0.606 -0.341 -1.180 -0.016 0.785 0.682 0.380
Net Migration Rate -0.021 -0.015 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.005 0.025 0.014
Net Migration Share -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.002
Growth 0.017 0.065 0.020 0.068 0.021 0.075 0.038 0.080
Tax 0.037 0.058 0.033 0.059 0.048 0.064 0.045 0.067
Capital 0.324 0.234 0.383 0.222 0.350 0.238 0.414 0.274
Ethnic 0.035 0.098 0.028 0.100 0.229 0.299 0.055 0.183
High School 0.344 0.706 0.344 0.710 0.278 0.646 0.424 0.745
Female 0.501 0.534 0.498 0.540 0.507 0.604 0.485 0.527
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Table 2: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Analysis (US Census Data)
This table presents the di¤-in-di¤ analysis of political competition and net migration using data from
the US Census data. In Panel A, we report results of the univariate di¤-in-di¤ analysis. The treatment
group is Southern states including Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, South
Carolina, North Carolina, and Arizona. The control group is all other states. The baseline period is from
1940 to 1960 (inclusive) and the follow up period is 1970 onwards. In Panel B, we regress net migration
variables and political competition against a dummy variable that equals 1 if the state belongs to the
treatment group and the time period is 1970 onward. All regressions in Panel B include individual
(state) xed e¤ects and time e¤ects but they are not reported. t-statistics based on robust cluster
standard errors (clustered by state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance
levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
PANEL A: Univariate Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Analysis
Base Line Follow Up
Control Treated Di¤(BL) Control Treated Di¤(FU) Di¤-in-Di¤
PC -0.078 -0.250 -0.172 -0.066 -0.062 0.004 0.176
Std. Error 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.013 0.015
t -statistics -21.010 -21.950 -19.780 2.090 14.970 13.600 11.380
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.757 0.000
Net migration -0.003 0.038 0.041 -0.221 1.067 1.288 1.247
Std. Error 0.135 0.288 0.319 0.134 0.288 0.318 0.450
t -statistics -0.020 0.140 0.130 -1.640 4.140 3.960 2.770
P-value 0.983 0.894 0.897 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.006
Net migration rate -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.019 0.021 0.017
Std. Error 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.011
t -statistics -0.720 0.620 0.560 0.030 2.430 2.210 1.560
P-value 0.470 0.781 0.576 0.481 0.007 0.006 0.120
Net migration share 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.006
Std. Error 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
t -statistics -0.070 0.290 0.270 -1.350 3.520 3.200 2.260
P-value 0.946 0.793 0.790 0.158 0.002 0.001 0.024
PANEL B: Multivariate Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Analysis
Net Migration Net Migration Rate Net Migration Share Political Competition
Post-1970 Southern State 1.246*** 0.0167** 0.00603** 0.170***
(3.185) (2.123) (2.654) (5.934)
Constant -8.6210 4 -1.8210 4 -5.6210 6 -0.0902***
(-0.00549) (-0.0539) (-0.00929) (-12.00)
N 404 404 404 627
R2 0.036 0.025 0.024 0.407
No. of states 51 51 51 50
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Table 3: Panel regressions for net migration (US Census data: 1940-2010)
This table presents results of the panel regressions of net migra-
tion. The migration data is sourced from the US Census from 1940
through 2010. The dependent variable is the net migration (indi-
viduals) in state i in year t (scaled by 100,000). Our explantory
variables contain the following state-year variables: the level of
political competition within the state (PC ), indicator variables=1
if PC>-0.10 (PC1 ), PC>-0.25 (PC2 ), and PC>-0.4 (PC3 ), the
income growth (Growth), tax collected as a percentage of total
income (Tax ), total capital expenditure as a percentage of taxes
(Capital), the percentage of non-white population (Non-white),
the percentage of adults (>25 years old) with high school diploma
(HighSchool), and the previous periods net migration (LNM ). All
regressions contain individual (state) xed e¤ects and time xed ef-
fects but they are not reported. t-statistics based on robust cluster
standard errors (clustered by state) are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC 3.961*** 7.518*** 3.702*
(3.430) (2.783) (1.919)
PC1 0.376** 0.477
(2.678) (1.461)
PC2 0.756 0.184
(1.659) (0.245)
PC3 -0.129 0.307
(-0.300) (0.232)
Growth 66.12*** 58.01***
(9.056) (7.825)
Tax -9.886 -14.43
(-0.525) (-0.716)
Capital -0.101 -0.595
(-0.0652) (-0.381)
Gender 2.581* 9.893***
(1.927) (4.866)
Non-white -4.098* -16.68***
(-1.880) (-4.955)
High School 0.00985 0.0543**
(0.446) (2.351)
LNM 0.261*** 0.169***
(5.564) (3.620)
Constant 0.484*** -0.946** -4.522* -9.730***
(2.688) (-2.364) (-1.925) (-3.492)
N 396 396 404 290 290
R2 0.030 0.006 0.026
No. of states 50 50 51 50 50
Method OLS IV OLS SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
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Table 4: Panel regressions of net migration rate (US Census data: 1940-2010)
This table presents results of the panel regressions of net migra-
tion. The migration data is sourced from the US Census from 1940
through 2010. The dependent variable is the net migration of state
i in year t as a percentage of state is population. Our explantory
variables contain the following state-year variables: the level of po-
litical competition within the state (PC ), indicator variables=1 if
PC>-0.10 (PC1 ), PC>-0.25 (PC2 ), and PC>-0.4 (PC3 ), the in-
come growth (Growth), tax collected as a percentage of total income
(Tax ), total capital expenditure as a percentage of taxes (Capital),
the percentage of non-white population (Non-white), the percentage
of adults (>25 years old) with high school diploma (HighSchool), and
the previous periods net migration (LNM ). All regressions contain
individual (state) xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects but they are not
reported. t-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors (clus-
tered by state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC 0.0657** 0.0968** 0.120***
(2.066) (2.071) (4.201)
PC1 0.0142* 0.0156***
(1.788) (3.081)
PC2 -0.00139 0.00476
(-0.122) (0.399)
PC3 0.00244 0.00234
(0.233) (0.111)
Growth 1.769*** 1.714***
(16.78) (15.10)
Tax -0.479* -0.432
(-1.959) (-1.586)
Capital -0.0790*** -0.0847***
(-3.643) (-3.727)
Gender -0.0369* -0.000964
(-1.851) (-0.0326)
Non-white 0.0337 -0.0273
(1.039) (-0.560)
High School 0.00132*** 0.00165***
(4.045) (4.504)
LNM -0.00715 -0.0480
(-0.203) (-1.313)
Constant 0.00837* -0.00611 -0.145*** -0.205***
(1.700) (-0.648) (-4.525) (-5.045)
N 396 396 404 290 290
R2 0.031 0.028 0.039
No. of states 50 50 51 50 50
Method OLS IV OLS SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
42
Table 5: Panel regressions of net migration share (US Census data: 1940-2010)
This table presents results of the panel regressions of net migration.
The migration data is sourced from the US Census from 1940 through
2010. The dependent variable is the net migration of state i in year
t as a fraction of all migrating individuals in time t. Our explan-
tory variables contain the following state-year variables: the level of
political competition within the state (PC ), indicator variables=1 if
PC>-0.10 (PC1 ), PC>-0.25 (PC2 ), and PC>-0.4 (PC3 ), the income
growth (Growth), tax collected as a percentage of total income (Tax ),
total capital expenditure as a percentage of taxes (Capital), the per-
centage of non-white population (Non-white), the percentage of adults
(>25 years old) with high school diploma (HighSchool), and the previ-
ous periods net migration (LNM ). All regressions contain individual
(state) xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects but they are not reported.
t-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors (clustered by state)
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance levels
of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PC 0.0178** 0.0365** 0.0101
(2.588) (2.438) (1.257)
PC1 0.00161* 0.00193
(1.816) (1.555)
PC2 0.00440 0.00228
(1.662) (0.791)
PC3 -0.00234 -0.00693
(-0.949) (-1.363)
Growth 0.320*** 0.258***
(10.44) (8.920)
Tax -0.0717 -0.0875
(-0.929) (-1.157)
Capital -0.000690 -0.00237
(-0.108) (-0.399)
Gender 0.0151*** 0.0687***
(2.671) (8.058)
Non-white -0.0245*** -0.117***
(-2.665) (-8.247)
High School -3.6110 5 1.5910 4*
(-0.383) (1.757)
LNM 0.146*** -0.0145
(3.746) (-0.373)
Constant 0.00228** -0.00342 -0.0143 -0.0326***
(2.600) (-1.104) (-1.454) (-3.015)
N 396 396 404 290 290
R2 0.017 -0.002 0.017
No. of states 50 50 51 50 50
Method OLS IV OLS SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
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Table 6: Panel regressions of net migration (IRS data: 1988-2010)
This table presents results of the panel regressions of net migration. The migration data
is sourced from US IRS from 1988 through 2010. The dependent variable is the net
migration (households) in state i in year t (scaled by 100,000). Our explantory variables
contain the following state-year variables: the level of political competition within the
state (PC ), indicator variables=1 if PC>-0.10 (PC1 ) and PC>-0.25 (PC2 ), the per-
centage of people employed (Employment), tax collected as a percentage of total income
(Tax ), total capital expenditure as a percentage of taxes (Capital), the percentage of
black population (Black), the percentage of highschool dropouts (Dropout), the percent-
age of female (Female), a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Governor is a Democrat
(Democrat), the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican in-
cumbents in all statewide races (excluding the president) (Control), and the previous
periods net migration (LNM ). All regressions contain individual (state) xed e¤ects
and time xed e¤ects but they are not reported. t-statistics based on robust cluster
standard errors (clustered by state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PC 82,265** 87,081** 95,220***
(2.270) (2.259) (3.446)
PC1 8,509** 8,930* 7,542**
(2.164) (1.790) (1.988)
PC2 -6,587** -1,095 -384.1
(-2.133) (-0.196) (-0.0373)
Growth -236,763 -242,197 89,796 75,128
(-1.106) (-1.105) (1.257) (0.953)
Employment 88,043 81,514 207,397* 195,252
(0.454) (0.417) (1.735) (1.253)
Tax -1.053106** -1.020106** -979,029*** -943,684**
(-2.207) (-2.116) (-3.407) (-2.415)
Capital -63,042 -68,892 16,310 22,582
(-0.865) (-0.946) (0.371) (0.421)
Black 65,985 73,578 159,402** 186,871*
(0.546) (0.597) (2.085) (1.740)
Dropout -45,405 -44,107 -40,723 -39,131
(-0.407) (-0.392) (-0.458) (-0.414)
Female 12,535 12,372 11,969 23,846
(0.171) (0.167) (0.246) (0.441)
Democrat -4,464 -3,975 -1,546 -1,328
(-0.711) (-0.622) (-0.451) (-0.356)
Control -3,639 -3,258 -3,890 -4,233
(-0.848) (-0.761) (-1.516) (-1.564)
LNM 0.980*** 0.992***
(17.89) (16.85)
Constant 5,436*** -1,925 41,374 32,002 -85,746 -100,944
(3.696) (-0.788) (0.376) (0.280) (-1.062) (-1.043)
N 487 1,025 371 371 326 326
R2 0.020 0.005 0.063 0.058
No. of states 50 52 47 47 47 47
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
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Table 7: Panel regressions of net migration rate (IRS data: 1988-2010)
This table presents results of the panel regressions of net migration. The mi-
gration data is sourced from US IRS from 1988 through 2010. The dependent
variable is the net migration of state i in year t as a percentage of state is
population. Our explantory variables contain the following state-year variables:
the level of political competition within the state (PC ), indicator variables=1
if PC>-0.10 (PC1 ) and PC>-0.25 (PC2 ), the percentage of people employed
(Employment), tax collected as a percentage of total income (Tax ), total capital
expenditure as a percentage of taxes (Capital), the percentage of black popula-
tion (Black), the percentage of highschool dropouts (Dropout), the percentage
of female (Female), a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Governor is a De-
mocrat (Democrat), the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of
Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the president) (Con-
trol), and the previous periods net migration (LNM ). All regressions contain
individual (state) xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects but they are not reported.
t-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors (clustered by state) are re-
ported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PC 0.00438 0.0116** 0.0101***
(0.943) (2.167) (2.653)
PC1 0.000577 0.000893 0.000747
(1.272) (1.396) (1.514)
PC2 -0.000852 -0.000266 0.00239
(-1.145) (-0.232) (1.580)
Growth -0.0160 -0.0182 0.0372*** 0.0393***
(-0.584) (-0.635) (4.225) (4.009)
Employment -0.0148 -0.0158 -0.00906 -0.0241
(-0.358) (-0.367) (-0.531) (-1.049)
Tax -0.173*** -0.165** -0.0185 -0.0286
(-2.752) (-2.657) (-0.535) (-0.598)
Capital -0.00402 -0.00516 0.00244 0.00469
(-0.467) (-0.571) (0.499) (0.771)
Black 0.00197 0.00448 -0.00219 -0.00487
(0.0970) (0.214) (-0.291) (-0.508)
Dropout 0.0166 0.0182 0.0342*** 0.0417***
(0.803) (0.863) (2.731) (3.114)
Female -0.0146 -0.0142 -0.00165 -0.00434
(-1.245) (-1.198) (-0.285) (-0.678)
Democrat -0.00128 -0.00123 -0.000485 -0.000360
(-1.347) (-1.280) (-1.115) (-0.764)
Control -0.000127 -3.40e-05 -5.49e-06 -0.000107
(-0.258) (-0.0694) (-0.0153) (-0.288)
LNM 1.018*** 1.026***
(17.71) (16.67)
Constant -0.000399 0.000190 0.0273 0.0257 0.00250 0.00877
(-0.159) (0.307) (1.178) (1.069) (0.233) (0.676)
N 437 916 326 326 280 280
R2 0.074 0.033 0.167 0.158
No. of states 50 51 47 47 47 47
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
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Table 8: Panel regressions of net migration share (IRS data: 1988-2010)
This table presents results of the panel regressions of net migration. The mi-
gration data is sourced from US IRS from 1988 through 2010. The dependent
variable is the net migration of state i in year t as a fraction of all migrating
households in year t. Our explantory variables contain the following state-year
variables: the level of political competition within the state (PC ), indicator
variables=1 if PC>-0.10 (PC1 ) and PC>-0.25 (PC2 ), the percentage of people
employed (Employment), tax collected as a percentage of total income (Tax ),
total capital expenditure as a percentage of taxes (Capital), the percentage of
black population (Black), the percentage of highschool dropouts (Dropout), the
percentage of female (Female), a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Governor
is a Democrat (Democrat), the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction
of Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the president) (Con-
trol), and the previous periods net migration (LNM ). All regressions contain
individual (state) xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects but they are not reported.
t-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors (clustered by state) are re-
ported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PC 0.0243** 0.0264** 0.0187**
(2.225) (2.289) (2.272)
PC1 0.00255** 0.00247* 0.00161
(2.250) (1.700) (1.438)
PC2 -0.00197** -0.000167 -0.000220
(-2.182) (-0.0929) (-0.0726)
Growth -0.0818 -0.0841 0.0110 0.0174
(-1.227) (-1.224) (0.515) (0.752)
Employment 0.0172 0.0151 -0.0265 -0.0421
(0.318) (0.277) (-0.749) (-0.919)
Tax -0.276** -0.264** -0.122 -0.0491
(-2.167) (-2.067) (-1.418) (-0.423)
Capital -0.0154 -0.0171 0.00707 0.0161
(-0.821) (-0.909) (0.539) (1.014)
Black 0.00949 0.0120 0.0148 0.00949
(0.307) (0.381) (0.660) (0.304)
Dropout -0.0152 -0.0150 -0.0149 -0.0139
(-0.499) (-0.487) (-0.556) (-0.494)
Female 0.00559 0.00565 0.00733 0.0119
(0.273) (0.272) (0.505) (0.746)
Democrat -0.00136 -0.00122 -0.000835 -0.000875
(-0.742) (-0.649) (-0.817) (-0.797)
Control -0.00118 -0.00108 -0.000960 -0.00109
(-0.874) (-0.788) (-1.258) (-1.368)
LNM 0.730*** 0.713***
(15.90) (14.56)
Constant 0.00161*** -0.000573 0.0152 0.0123 0.0114 0.0105
(3.554) (-0.704) (0.481) (0.374) (0.478) (0.372)
N 487 1,025 371 371 326 326
R2 0.021 0.006 0.072 0.064
No. of states 50 52 47 47 47 47
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
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